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Many industrialized economies have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality and
in the globalization of production since the 1980s. In this paper I propose an open
economy model of executive pay to study how offshoring affects the pay level and
incentives of top earners. The model introduces a simple principal-agent problem
into a heterogeneous firm talent assignment model and endogenizes pay levels and
the sensitivity of pay to performance in general equilibrium. Using unique data of
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1 Introduction
Past decades have witnessed a sharp increase in top income inequality, particularly
within industrialized economies. Simultaneously, various technological and institutional
developments in the world economy have led to a deeper international fragmentation of
production across national borders. While some manufacturing and service tasks are
now frequently done offshore, other more knowledge- and headquarter-intensive tasks
continue to be undertaken domestically within industrialized economies.1
In this paper, I study the effects of offshoring on the compensation level, dispersion and
performance sensitivity of executives, the occupational group at the top of the corpo-
rate hierarchy. To guide the empirical analysis, I develop a stylized general equilibrium
model of executive pay that allows to analyze how international integration affects pay
levels, pay-performance sensitivities and inequality. The model predicts that interna-
tional integration raises competition for top talents and thus leads to an increase in
the level and dispersion of executive pay and higher pay-performance sensitivities. I
quantify these effects using a unique panel dataset of matched director-firm level data
in combination with industry-level information on offshoring.
Executive pay is typically not only determined on the labor market but pay contracts
are also designed to solve agency problems at the management level within firms. This
differentiates executive compensation from pay in other occupations as a substantial
part of the payment is paid in equity with fluctuating market value. The model reflects
this feature of executive pay by introducing a stylized principal agent model into a ge-
neral equilibrium talent assignment model with a monopolistically competitive market.
Specifically, I introduce the agency problem from Edmans et al. (2009) into a general
equilibrium assignment framework with monopolistic competition. Agents have multi-
plicative preferences over leisure and the consumption of differentiated varieties. The
stylized contracting problem then allows to focus on the division of pay into fixed and
performance-sensitive components disregarding the optimal level of pay. The latter
then is determined in general equilibrium. I show that there is a unique equilibrium,
where only firms with non-negative expected profits enter the market, labor markets
clear and product demand is endogenized given the multiplicative preferences and in-
comes. The level and the sensitivity of pay are therefore simultaneously determined
1For example, improvements in information and communication technologies have reduced the costs
of knowledge transfer across countries to levels that are comparable to the costs of knowledge transfers
within national borders (see e.g. Baldwin (2016)). Furthermore, political and economic reforms in
labor abundant economies such as China, India, and Eastern Europe have liberalized economic activity
and reduced the costs of transport. See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015), Hummels et al. (2001),
Johnson and Noguera (2012) or Timmer et al. (2014) among others for evidence on the increasing
international fragmentation of production.
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by the product market, the labor market and the agency conflict inside firms. While
the most skilled agents in the economy are matched with the largest firms and earn
the highest salaries, less skilled agents specialize in production activities leading to a
positive association between talent, executive pay and firm size. Also the dollar value of
incentive compensation increases with firm size while the executives’ ownership shares
decrease with firm size.
Similar to Antràs et al. (2006), I then extend the framework towards a two-country mo-
del where countries differ in their distributions of talent and agents can match across
countries (offshoring). More talented managers have a comparative advantage in ma-
naging larger firms and benefit relatively more from the increased supply of Southern
agents. Furthermore, this type of international integration raises global product de-
mand. Both effects of globalization increase the skill premium of managers in the
North. In contrast to Antràs et al. (2006), managers receive only a fraction of their
remuneration as cash salary while the remainder is paid in equity. Thus, globalization
affects the incentives that managers face as their compensation packages become more
sensitive to performance.
The model delivers the following key insights. First, offshoring increases the level of
total executive pay in the Northern economy. Second, offshoring raises inequality of
pay both among executives across different firms and between executives and workers.
Third, offshoring increases the dollar elasticity of equity of Northern managers such that
executive compensation becomes more sensitive to firm performance and managers face
steeper incentives.
To study these predictions empirically, I construct matched director-firm data, cove-
ring executive boards in public companies that are listed among one of the major stock
indices in the U.S. and Europe. The data comprise the labor market for top executives
between 2000 and 2014. Using information on trade flows from international input-
output tables at the country-industry level, I link the compensation of executives to
their exposure to intermediate goods trade (offshoring). In order to isolate changes
in offshoring that are exogenous to executive compensation and uncorrelated with po-
tential unobservable supply and demand shocks, I follow Hummels et al. (2014) and
exploit variation in the global supply of exported intermediate inputs in the rest of the
world to instrument for the offshoring intensity.2 This variation in the world supply
of inputs captures changes in the comparative advantages of sourcing countries over
time that might arise from changes in production prices, production variety or product
quality. Consistent with the presented theory, I find that the rise in the global division
2The world export supply is the total supply of an input from origin countries to the world market
net of the supply to and from the importing country under consideration.
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of labor has affected top earnings in various ways. The estimated magnitudes of the in-
strumental variable regressions suggest that the sample mean rise in offshoring between
2000 and 2014 has increased the level of executive pay by between 4.5 and 7.2%. This
increase in the executive pay premium varies substantially across firm size with larger
firms paying a higher premium. I find only mild effects of offshoring on within-firm
inequality, consistent with recent evidence from Song et al. (2015) for the U.S. labor
market. With respect to the incentives that managers face, I find that offshoring is
associated with a 13.0% rise in stock prices and a 10.3% rise in enterprise value during
the sample period. This has contributed to both, a 11.5% larger value of executives’
stocks and a 9.6% higher wealth delta, the dollar wealth change per realized percentage
stock return.
The paper covers a question at the intersection between labor economics, organizational
economics and international trade and thus relates to various strands of the literature.
First, I contribute to the literature that considers CEO pay in talent assignment mo-
dels. The talent assignment models by Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans et al.
(2009), Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012), Baranchuk et al. (2011) and Terviö (2008)
study the relation between CEO pay and the product market. These models either
consider an exogenous mass of firms or an exogenous demand level in the economy and
are well suited to explain the cross-section of CEO pay levels or CEO pay-performance
sensitivities. However, since product demand and/or the mass of firms in the economy
are exogenous, these models deliver only limited information about responses of exe-
cutive pay to aggregate shocks in the economy. By introducing the assignment and
principal-agent problem into a general equilibrium framework, my model makes pre-
dictions how the cross-section of CEO pay contracts responds to economic integration
based on comparative statics.
Second, the paper relates to a literature in international trade that studies how offsho-
ring is organized. Antràs et al. (2006) and Antràs et al. (2008) propose a hierarchical
assignment theory based on Garicano (2000), where heterogeneous workers form hier-
archical teams across borders. They model offshoring as the opportunity of agents in
industrialized countries to match with agents from other countries that differ in skill
endowments. Offshoring increases the match quality and consequently also the skill
premium for Northern top managers. In my model, globalization comprises a similar
comparative statics exercise: agents from a skill-abundant country can form matches
with agents from a skill-scarce country. However, this type of international integration
also affects the pay-performance elasticity and product demand, here. In that spirit,
Gumpert (2014) argues that falling communication costs increase the leverage of ma-
nagerial knowledge leading to a larger wage premium on knowledge in multinational
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headquarters. Marin et al. (2015) investigate how offshoring affects decentralization, as
an alternative incentive device, in a small open economy model.
Third, the paper relates to theoretical and empirical studies that analyze the effects of
offshoring and other types of trade integration on various labor market outcomes. Gros-
sman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) propose a theory of global production and investigate
how falling offshoring costs affect factor prices. They show that one might expect a
widening of the wage gap between managers and production workers if production jobs
are also the most offshorable ones.3 Feenstra and Hanson (1999) estimate the influence
of trade in tasks and technological advancements on the wage gap between high and low
skilled U.S. workers between 1979 and 1990. They argue that offshoring explains about
40 percent of the increase in relative wages. Becker et al. (2013) find that offshoring
shifted the wage bill towards more non-routine and more interactive tasks in German
multinationals. Also Hummels et al. (2014) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) find for Den-
mark, respectively Germany, that wage effects of offshoring vary across occupational
task characteristics. Offshoring has the largest positive wage effect on tasks that require
communication and language, followed by social sciences and maths. Notably, all these
skills are categorical for managerial occupations. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009, 2005)
show empirically that tougher import competition increases the performance elasticity
of executive pay.
Fourth, the paper is related to other studies on top income inequality and macroe-
conomic developments. Atkinson et al. (2011) and Alvaredo et al. (2013) document a
general trend of increasing top 1% income shares for many industrialized countries since
the 1980s or even earlier with the exception of the Great Recession period (see Piketty
and Saez (2013)). As executives account for roughly one third of the top 1% in the
U.S. income distribution (see Bakija et al. (2008)), their incomes comprise a relevant
fraction of the top income inequality. Lustig et al. (2011) and Frydman and Papani-
kolaou (2016) develop models of executive pay inequality where inequality changes as
a result of technological change. Monte (2011) develops a talent assignment model of
final goods trade and technological change and parameterizes it to the U.S. While these
models focus on inequality in pay levels, they do not account for agency problems and
performance compensation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theory,
section 3 presents the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
3To the extent that offshoring is associated with reductions in consumer prices, production workers
may still benefit from increases in real wages.
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2 A Model of Executive Pay and Offshoring
This section proposes a theory that introduces the stylized principal-agent problem
from Edmans et al. (2009) into a talent assignment model with heterogeneous firms.
Agents differ in their managerial talents and form teams that consist of an executive and
production workers to produce output. Agency problems at the management level rati-
onalize that executive pay comprises cash and equity. The model links the cross-section
of executive pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities to basic utility, technology and
endowment parameters in general equilibrium. In subsection 2.4, I extend the model
towards a two-country setting. Countries have different support in their talent dis-
tributions: while talents in the North are distributed between 0 and 1, talents in the
South are distributed between 0 and α < 1. Firms can now arise from matching agents
across countries and output is consumed globally. I use this model to study potential
implications of international integration on the executive earnings inequality.
2.1 Basic Setup: The Closed Economy
Preferences and Endowments The economy is populated by a mass of agents nor-
malized to 1. Agents differ in their level of management skills but they are equal in the
skills that they provide as production workers. Management skills are uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and 1. All agents have multiplicative preferences over consumption
and leisure and maximize their expected utility U = E [u · g (e)], where u is a standard
c.e.s. consumption aggregator and g (e) reflects the agent’s leisure, i.e. the (inverse)
cost of effort. The corresponding indirect utility V is given by







where w (s) is the nominal income of an agent with skill level s and P is the c.e.s. price
index in the economy such that w(s)
P
will be the individual’s real income. Notably, this
multiplicative form of the indirect utility function implies that the utility gains from
leisure are increasing with the level of compensation (both are complements). Agents’
effort is a binary variable e ∈ {e, e} and normalized to e = 0 > e>-1. The leisure





1 if e = e
1
1+Λe
if e = e, Λ ∈ [0, 1)
, (2)
which implies that low effort (e) will increase the agent’s utility by a fraction Λ |e|.
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On the technological side, the economy is endowed with a mass of potential production
technologies whose quality is denoted by z. Technologies are also uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. Similar to Chaney (2008), this mass of production technologies
comprises the mass of potential entrants into the market.4
Production and Firms Firms are active on a monopolistically competitive market
such that agents spend xj = X (pj/P)
1−σ on each variety j. Here, σ > 1 is the con-
stant elasticity of substitution and X is the aggregate consumption expenditure in the
economy (the nominal GDP). Firms originate from the matching of a manager to a
production technology and a hired team of production workers in proportion to the
firm output.5 The productivity of each firm is determined by the quality of the pro-
duction technology z and the skill level s of the manager, where I make the assumption
that management skills and production technologies complement each other regarding
the production of output. In particular, the unit costs of production for a firm with a
technology z and a manager with skill s are given by




where w is the production labor wage that I will use as the numéraire such that w =
1. The parameter 0 < µ < 1 measures the influence of management skills on firm
productivity. Given the c.e.s. demand, firms charge a constant markup over their unit
costs of production and obtain a profit of π (z, s) per variety:











XP σ−1 captures the “size” of the market from the perspective
of an individual variety. Markets are “large” if the elasticity of substitution is low and
the aggregate expenditure level X or the price index P are large.
Agency Problem Since the objective of the model is to introduce a motive for incen-
tive payments into a general equilibrium and provide empirically testable predictions,
I introduce a very parsimonious agency problem. Executive compensation is restricted
4This implies that the number of available (however, bad) technologies is sufficient to accommo-
date any number of managers in equilibrium. Like in Chaney (2008), I assume that all production
technologies are owned by some mutual fund (the principal) that maximizes the individual profits of
each firm.
5The occupational choice between production work and managerial work will be endogenized later,
when an equilibrium is determined. Unlike in Melitz (2003), where the production labor supply is
fixed and similar to Wu (2011) and Monte (2011), the allocation of agents into production worker jobs
and management jobs endogenously pins down the supply of production labor.
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to comprise cash and equity and a contract will characterize how the the income of a
manager is split into a cash payment and equity ownership. Due to the risk-neutrality
of agents, there will be a continuum of incentive-compatible contracts and I will follow
Edmans et al. (2009) and define the optimal contract as the incentive-compatible con-
tract that minimizes the variable component of compensation as this would be strictly
optimal under any nonzero risk aversion. Agents are subject to limited liability and
obtain an (expected) equilibrium pay of r (s) which will be endogenized later in general
equilibrium. For now, I treat the expected pay r (s) as exogenous. Production work
does not entail any agency frictions since effort of production workers is assumed to be
perfectly contractable such that g = 1 for all agents that become production workers.
Management is however subject to agency frictions since agents are subject to limited
liability and managerial effort is unobservable. I model this unobservability of effort
in the following manner: executives elicit effort to find projects for the firm. Each
project corresponds to one variety and a firm produces a continuum of varieties equal
to (1 + η) (1 + e), where η ≥ −1 is stochastic noise with mean 0 such that the expected
mass of projects when the executive elicits high effort is 1. Each variety generates a
profit stream of π (z, s). That way, low effort e = e reduces firm value by a fraction e
and the effect of effort changes firm value proportionally. Hence, the model captures
decisions that can be “rolled-out” across the firm rather than decisions that have effects
independent of firm size. I assume that the value gains from high effort exceed the
managers’ disutility such that it is optimal to elicit effort e = e. An executive’s realized
income w (s) can be split up into a fixed cash salary f ≥ 0 and a share v of the firm’s
equity
w (s) = f + v (1 + η) (1 + e) π.
2.2 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Consider an independent economy where agents that are employed as executives match
with technologies and other agents employed as workers. In equilibrium the following
conditions hold. First, firms offer the optimal amount of cash f and equity share v
such that the manager elicits high effort (e = 0) and the contract pays the manager’s
expected wage r (s). Second, due to the complementarity of management talent and
production technologies, there will be a positive assignment of managers and technolo-
gies such that the upper tails of the talent and the technology distribution match and
s = z for each matched pair (s, z). Third, agents choose the occupation (executive or
production worker) based on their expected compensation given their level of skill s
such that an agent chooses to become a manager if and only if r (s) ≥ 1. Fourth, only
firms that make non-negative expected profits will enter the market. Fifth, labor mar-
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kets clear. The aggregate demand for production labor corresponds to the aggregate
supply of workers and the aggregate demand for executives equals the aggregate supply
of executives. Equivalently, the aggregate income of agents is spent on goods produced
by the firms in the economy.
I will discuss each property of the equilibrium successively and characterize the unique
equilibrium for the economy.
Incentive Pay in Partial Equilibrium Suppose a manager with skill s expects
a level of compensation r (s). The optimal allocation of executive pay into cash and
equity will pay a fraction Λ of the expected compensation in shares and the remainder
in cash:
r (s) Λ = v∗π (s, z)
r (s) (1− Λ) = f ∗. (5)
The manager’s realized compensation w (s) can then be stated as
w (s) = r (s) (1 + Λθ) ,
where θ is the realized return on equity. A manager’s realized compensation will be
particularly high if his expect compensation r (s) is large or his effort costs Λ are high.
Furthermore, the realized compensation will also be particularly large if the realized
return θ is high.
Assignment and Expected Level of Compensation Consider the expected sur-
plus of a firm with manager s and technology z:





The expected surplus must cover the compensation of the manager and the profits that
accrue to the technology z. The skill-technology complementarity which drives the
incentive to positive assortative assignment is given by the positive cross derivative of
the surplus (∂2M (z1−µsµ)
σ−1
/∂s∂z > 0). This complementarity between production
technologies and management skills in combination with a competitive labor market
creates an incentive for better firms (higher z) to hire better managers leading to a
positive assortative assignment.6
6The positive assortative assignment of managers to firms is an essential factor in the CEO assig-
nment literature: see for example Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), Edmans et al. (2009),
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An individual firm is assumed to be too small to affect the aggregate market conditions
such that each firm takes the expected wage function r (s) as given. I make use of a
standard assignment equation which equates the expected marginal cost of a manager
with skill s with the expected marginal benefit of this manager. As the optimal manager
with ability s balances the marginal benefit of a higher skill level with the marginal
increase in expected managerial compensation:
∂E [(1 + η) (1 + e) π (z, s)]
∂s |z=z(s)
= r′ (s) . (6)
Positive assignments will imply that the measures of the upper tails of the skill and
technology distributions are of equal size such that z = s. Furthermore, the marginal
manager in the economy (I denote his skill level by sc) must be indifferent between
a management or a production work occupation such that r (sc) = 1. To determine
the expected compensation function I integrate (6) over the skill distribution and set
r (sc) = 1. The expected compensation of a manager can be stated as





where sc is the skill level of the marginal manager in the economy that runs the least
productive firm in the market and earns a wage that is equal to the production worker
wage rate. Intuitively, the level of expected compensation that a manager will receive
in equilibrium increases with the size of the market M , the importance of management
skills in the production process µ and the level of the manager’s skill s relative to the
skill-level of the marginal manager in the economy sc. Since both, the marginal skill
level and the size of the market will be determined in general equilibrium, the expected
compensation stated in equation (7) can be seen as the partial equilibrium form of
expected executive pay and the term µM (sσ−1 − sσ−1c ) comprises the skill premium of
managers.
Zero Earnings Cutoff Only firms with non-negative expected earnings will enter
into the market. The marginal firm that employs the marginal manager with skill sc
will just break even such that Msσ−1c − 1 = 0. Replacing M and rearranging terms
Baranchuk et al. (2011) or Monte (2011). Furthermore, consider the following intuitive argument to see
why a positive assortative assignment arises in equilibrium. Suppose there were two technology-skill
matches (z1, s2) and (z2, s1) that form firms in equilibrium with z1 < z2 and s1 < s2. The aggregate
surplus could be increased by making the manager with skill s1 the head of the firm with production
technology z1 and the other manager with skill s2 the head of the firm with z2 instead. Since any
competitive equilibrium is efficient, this is a contradiction.
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yields the zero earnings cutoff condition X(sc):
X = s1−σc − sc. (8)
The zero earnings cutoff condition X(sc) is negatively sloped since a larger nominal
GDP translates into higher firm revenues. In order to restore zero earnings in the
marginal firm, the cutoff skill level sc must be smaller to reduce the productivity of the
marginal firm in the economy.
Labor Market Clearing In contrast to the classical Melitz (2003) model with he-
terogeneous firms, production worker supply is endogenous here, since the mass of
production workers depends on the mass of managers. Labor market clearing requires
that the aggregate demand for production workers equals the aggregate supply of pro-
duction workers (sc) for any given amount of executives (i.e. firms). A firm needs 1/ϕj
units of labor per unit of output and produces qj units of output such that its demand












Integrating production labor demand for the individual firm over all active firms of the





Since the production wage rate is the numéraire, equation (9) can also be seen as the
income approach of GDP measurement. In the aggregate, GDP comprises wages paid




labor market clearing curve is upward sloping since a larger sc translates to a higher
supply of production labor which must be absorbed by firms producing a higher level
of output.
2.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Clearing of the labor markets and the zero earnings cutoff uniquely determine the mar-
ginal managerial skill level sc and the nominal GDP X in the economy. The following
Proposition describes the equilibrium solution.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium in the closed economy such that
labor markets clear, no firms with negative expected earnings enter the market, the
matching of managers and technologies is stable and firms provide optimal incentives
for managers. This equilibrium has the following properties:
















iii) the expected compensation level of a manager with skill s is equal to


















v) however their value of equity is larger:
v∗π (s) =
(









in addition to the worker salary. The size of that premium increases with the importance
of management in the production process µ, the executive’s skill s and the elasticity of
substitution σ. In partial equilibrium assignment models of executive pay (i.e. models
with an exogenous mass and distribution of firms) the equilibrium pay level is typically
increasing with the size of a “reference firm” in the economy and the aggregate market
size (see Gabaix and Landier (2008)). My general equilibrium framework also nests this
feature, however the mass of active firms and the size of the market are endogenized
here. The pay premium increases when the skill of the marginal executive in the eco-
nomy is relatively small. This translates to a relatively large market size M and also
to relatively high expected profits for the median firm with skill level (1+sc)/2.
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Given the optimal contract, the realized compensation w (s) is not indexed to the market
as the contract rewards executives for high firm-specific returns θ. Consequently, the
empirical observation of “pay-for-luck” (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)) is not
necessarily inconsistent with optimal CEO pay. Equivalently to Edmans et al. (2009),
the contract pays a fraction Λ of the executive’s expected compensation r (s) in equity.
Thus, the realized executive pay responds to idiosyncratic firm shocks.
The performance-pay sensitivity can be measured as the change of an executive’s dollar
value of compensation as a response to the firm’s realized return. This empirical proxy
can be derived from the deltas of the executives’ stock option grants and increases

















△ ln Firm Profits
.
Partial equilibrium models of executive pay are well suited to explain the cross-section
of CEO pay levels or CEO pay-performance sensitivities. However, as these models take
product demand and/or the mass of firms in the economy as exogenously given, they
deliver only limited information about responses of executive pay to aggregate shocks
in the economy. By introducing the assignment and principal-agent problem into a
general equilibrium framework, my model makes predictions how the cross-section of
CEO pay contracts responds to economic integration based on comparative statics.
2.4 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
Suppose that the economy discussed in the previous subsections (I will call it the North)
integrates with another economy (the South). The size of the South is denoted by L,
meaning that there is a mass of L agents living in the South and also a mass of L
potential production technologies originating from the South. However, the Southern
economy is more scarcely endowed with managerial talent and high-quality technologies
such that s and z are uniformly distributed between 0 and α < 1 in the South. In an
open economy equilibrium, agents can match across countries and form international
teams. Furthermore, goods are sold on a single integrated market. The distribution
of management skills and production technologies in the open economy is given by the
sum of the distributions in the South and in the North. Namely, densities of skill level







if 0 < i ≤ α
1 if α < i < 1,
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where i ∈ {s, z}. Notably, τ is not a probability distribution as it integrates to the
total size of the world market 1 + L. The equilibrium construction parallels the closed
economy case with three caveats. First, the labor market adjusts to the larger supply
of relatively low skilled agents in the world economy. Second, the derivation of the
expected compensation r (s) needs to be adjusted to the altered distribution of skills in
the open economy. Third, if some Southern agents become managers, the zero cutoff
earnings condition adjusts as well. For the remainder of the subsection I will discuss
two different cases. In one case, the North integrates with a skill scarce South such
that all Southern agents will be employed as production workers (α < sc). In the other
case, the Northern economy integrates with another relatively skill abundant economy
such that some Southern agents become employed as managers (sc ≤ α).
2.4.1 Equilibrium with Low-Skill Integration
Suppose that the Southern economy is relatively skill scarce such that all Southern
agents will be employed as production workers in equilibrium (α < sc). Integration
raises the supply of production workers from sc to sc + L such that the labor market




(sc + L) . (10)
The new labor market clearing curve X (sc) is above the curve in the closed economy.
For each value of sc, the supply of production labor is now larger due to the additional
agents from the South. In order to keep the labor market in equilibrium, the nomi-
nal GDP must be larger to accommodate these additional Southern agents. As there
are only firms managed by Northern managers, the zero cutoff earnings condition re-
mains unaffected by globalization. The following Proposition describes the equilibrium
solution in the world economy with low-skill integration.
Proposition 2. Suppose that α < sc. There exists a unique equilibrium in the open
economy such that labor markets clear, no firms with negative expected earnings enter
the market, the matching of managers and technologies is stable and firms provide
optimal incentives for managers. Compared to the closed economy, the marginal skill
level sc is lower. More agents in the North become managers and all managers receive a
larger expected compensation r (s). All managers obtain a smaller fraction of the firms’
equity v∗, however each manager’s value of equity is larger.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium with low-skill integration. The upper graph illustrates
the general equilibrium mechanics and the lower graph plots the expected compensation
across the skill distribution. Globalization corresponds to a supply shock of production
workers such that the labor market curve shifts upwards (LM∗). For the old margi-
nal skill level, there are too few active firms in order to accommodate the additional
production workers. Consequently, more firms enter the market and additional agents
from the North become executives (sc falls). Also the nominal GDP and the effective
market size M increase. Due to the increase of the effective market size, firms bid up the
expected compensation r (s) for all managers. Furthermore, as the expected compen-
sation level increases, executives also face stronger incentives (measured as change of





increases proportionally in r (s), this rise in the pay-performance
sensitivity is higher for managers of larger firms (i.e. managers with a higher s).
2.4.2 Equilibrium with High-Skill Integration
The equilibrium characterization is more involved when the Southern economy is more
skill abundant such that some Southern agents will become managers in equilibrium
(sc < α). These additional Southern managers imply that the price index is lower for
any value of sc as there are additional firms managed by Southern managers such that























Using the new price index PHI , the zero earnings cutoff condition X(sc) in the open










The curve for the zero earnings cutoff condition X(sc) in the open economy lies above
the curve in the closed economy or the low-skill integration case. Since the identical
cutoff skill level sc implies that there will be a larger mass of firms in the open economy,
the price level is lower for any value of sc. Consequently, the zero earnings cutoff firm
requires a higher level of aggregate expenditures for X to break even. This effect of
high-skill integration thus contributes to lower executive pay levels in the North as
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the additional supply of Southern executives lowers the aggregate price level and thus
reduces the effective market size M for any value of sc.
Also the labor market clearing curve adjusts as globalization increases the supply of
production workers to L+α
α
sc for any given value of sc. This leads to the new open







Similar to the open economy with low-skill integration, the increase in the supply of
Southern workers turns the labor market clearing curve upwards and therefore creates
upward pressure on executive pay levels. Both equations (12) and (13) determine the
marginal skill and the nominal GDP in equilibrium. The following Proposition describes
the equilibrium solution in the world economy with high-skill integration.
Proposition 3. Suppose that α ≥ sc. There exists a unique equilibrium in the open
economy such that labor markets clear, no firms with negative expected earnings enter
the market, the matching of managers and technologies is stable and firms provide
optimal incentives for managers. Compared to the closed economy, the marginal skill


















































+ 1 if sc < α < s.
All managers obtain a smaller fraction of the firms’ equity v∗, however each manager’s
value of equity is larger.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium with low-skill integration. Again the upper graph
illustrates the general equilibrium mechanics and the lower graph plots the expected
compensation across the skill distribution. Integration corresponds to a supply shock
of production workers such that the labor market curve turns upwards (LM∗). Furt-
hermore, the price index falls as there are α−sc
α
executives from the South managing
new firms. This shifts the zero earnings curve upwards (ZE∗) as for any level of sc, the
marginal firm requires a larger expenditure level to break even. Since the South is more
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talent scarce, the labor supply effect increases such that more firms enter the market
and additional agents from the North become executives (sc falls). Also the nominal
GDP and the effective market size M increase. Northern executives face stronger incen-
tives (∂w(s)
∂θ
rises) and expect a larger level of compensation r (s). Since ∂w(s)
∂θ
increases
proportionally in r (s), the increase in pay-performance sensitivity is again higher for
managers of larger firms.
2.5 Testable Predictions
The stylized model of executive pay gives rise to the following hypotheses that are
empirically testable.
Prediction 1: More offshoring increases the average level of executive pay.
Prediction 2: More offshoring increases the executive earnings inequality across firms.
Prediction 3: More offshoring increases the earnings inequality between executives and
production workers within firms.
Prediction 4: More offshoring increases the pay-performance sensitivity in executive
pay.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section addresses the testable hypotheses with the help of a unique individual-
level matched manager-firm panel dataset. The data combine information on individual
manager’s compensation with firm- and industry-level information. In order to isolate
fluctuations in offshoring that are exogenous to the wage-setting policies within firms
and uncorrelated with other unobserved supply or demand shocks, I will use fluctuations
in the world supply of intermediate inputs as instrumental variables.
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1.1 Pay-, Firm- and Industry-Level Data
I use comprehensive individual-level data on executive pay for a broad cross-section of
European and North American firms for the years 2000 to 2014. The data are provided
by BoardEx, a business intelligence service company that collects details on remunera-
tion and biographical information on business leaders across the world. BoardEx was
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established in 1999 and acquired by TheStreet, Inc. in 2014. It consolidates public dom-
ain information concerning the executives and senior managers of publicly quoted and
large private companies across countries. The data include details on direct compensa-
tion, including fixed and variable components, and equity-linked compensation. They
are based on public domain information including corporate announcements (such as
annual or interim reports, press releases or company websites), regulatory news services
or information releases from stock exchanges.
The individual manager-level data are matched with firm-level information from the
FactSet database. FactSet provides detailed financial and fundamental data on public
companies around the world. It includes public companies domiciled outside of the
United States and also contains a complete coverage of U.S. companies that are filing
with the Securities Exchange Commission (with the exception of closed end investment
companies). The total universe of covered companies represents approximately 95%
of global market capitalization. Since BoardEx covers managers in quoted companies
across the world, FactSet allows to match firm information to most of the managers
in the sample (I am able to match approximately 90% of the managers in BoardEx to
FactSet entities).
In order to quantify an individual manager’s exposure to globalization, I use data from
the WIOD project (World Input Output Database). WIOD tracks the flow of interme-
diate and final goods and services across countries and industries. In its 2016 release,
the data cover 43 countries and 56 sectors (based on ISIC Rev. 4) for the period 2000 to
2014. The industries cover all types of economic activity including agriculture, mining,
construction, utilities, manufacturing industries and service industries. To obtain the
offshoring indicator for an individual manager i who is employed at firm f in industry s
and country c during year t, I use the value of imported intermediates relative to the va-
lue of total intermediate consumption in the country-industry-year cell.7 One potential
concern with the offshoring measure arises from the fact that offshoring is correlated
with import competition at the output industry-level. As input-output tables suggest,
a large fraction of inputs typically stems from the same downstream industry which
implies a high correlation between both measures. Furthermore, previous literature has
identified a causal impact of import competition on wages (Autor et al. (2013)) and in
particular on executive compensation (Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009)). Therefore,
it is appealing to isolate both effects. I disentangle the effects of offshoring from import
7In my model, firms hire production workers in proportion to the firms’ output as the only variable
factor of production and globalization raises the supply of workers. In the model, firms spend a fraction
L+sc
L+1
(for low-skilled integration) or L
L+α
(for high-skilled integration) of their production labor wage
bill on foreign production workers. These terms correspond to the empirical proxy for the global
division of labor and are increasing in L.
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competition by controlling for the degree of import penetration within downstream in-
dustries s in some empirical specifications. In order to control for the simultaneity bias
when estimating the impact of integration on executive pay, I construct instruments
for offshoring that are time varying and uncorrelated with the wage setting within the
firms. Following Hummels et al. (2014) I construct the time varying country-industry
supply shock in intermediate goods by adding international trade flows of all interme-
diate goods outside the country considered and weighted according to a time-invariant
industry-specific input coefficient based on WIOD.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables.
- Table 1 here -
3.1.2 Sampling and Bias
BoardEx uses various sources to collect information on executive pay. Information
sources can be i) the sampled firm itself via annual reports or the company website,
ii) regulatory entities that publish official company information and press releases, iii)
stock exchanges, and iv) commercial other third party data providers providing bibli-
ographical information. These information are offered to subscribers for a fee. The
decision whether a firm is sampled in the BoardEx data is based on the firm’s listing
in a major stock market index. The data appendix provides a list of the sampled stock
indices.
In particular, the data providers focus on public stock index listed companies and to a
lesser extend on private companies such that executives of large public firms are largely
overrepresented in the sample. Furthermore, since pay disclosure requirements differ
across countries, executives employed by firms located in these countries (e.g. the U.S.
and the U.K.) are overrepresented as well. In order to address these biases, I will focus
on within-firm or within-individual pay variation over time as a response to changes
in the market environment. Over the sample period (2000 - 2014) the average firm is
sampled 6.6 times and the average director is sampled 4.2 times.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 The Cross-Section of Executive Pay
Due to the positive assignment implied by the complementarity between talent and firm
size, the model predicts that directors of larger firms should in equilibrium receive a hig-
her level of total and equity compensation, have a larger dollar-stock return sensitivity
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and own a smaller fraction of the firm. In order to establish that the theoretical model
captures these stylized features of executive pay in the cross-section of firms, I regress
size quartile dummies on the total level of annual compensation, the (estimated) value
of equity-linked compensation, the wealth delta, the executive-employee pay gap and
the executive ownership share in the firm. I include a set of region-year and industry
dummies and control for the type of the director position (CEO, executive director,
senior management position) throughout all estimations.
- Table 2 here -
Table 2 reports regression results based on the pooled cross-section of executives in the
sample. The estimated correlations generally confirm the predicted model features in
the data, although the estimations do not allow for a causal interpretation, here. Firm
size quartile dummies are based on the mean enterprise value (i.e. the market value
of equity plus total debt) over the whole sample period. The smallest quartile is the
omitted category throughout all columns. In column (1), I regress the size dummies
on the total annual compensation (in logs). Working for a top 25% firm is associated
with a 10.5 times higher pay level8, working for a top 25-50% firm is associated with 4.8
times higher pay level and working for a top 50-75% firm is associated with a 1.7 times
higher pay level compared to directors employed by firms in the lowest size quartile.
Column (2) shows that these pay-difference associations are quantitatively similar for
equity-linked compensation: factor 14.3 for top 25%, 5.9 for top 25-50%, 1.7 for top
50-75%. Since the stylized agency problem in the model implies that each executive
obtains on average a constant fraction Λ of his compensation in equity, the theory would
predict identical coefficients for both, equity and total compensation.
Column (3) shows how the cross-section of managerial incentives, measured by the
wealth delta (in logs), vary with firm size. The wealth delta approximates by how
many dollars an executive’s wealth changes as a response to a 1% change in firm value
and is therefore a proxy of ∂w(s)
∂θ
≈ △ $ Compensation
△ ln Firm Profits
in the model. Deltas are calculated
from all current and previous share and option grants using a Black-Scholes formula.
In a top 25% firm, director wealth is 9.4 times more elastic compared to the wealth
elasticity in the lowest quartile. Similar to the level of executive pay, wealth elasticity
scales up with firm size. It is 3.7 times larger in a top 25-50% firm and 1.2 times larger
in a top 50-75% firm compared to the wealth elasticity of executives working for firms
in the lowest size quartile.
Column (4) reports correlations for the within-firm executive-employee pay ratio (in
logs). Within-firm executive-employee pay ratios are obtained by dividing the total
8(exp (2.444)− 1)× 100% ≈ 1052%
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compensation of a director by the total labor expenses per employee of the employing
firm. The correlates suggest that within-firm pay inequality generally increases with
firm size. The pay gap is 11.7 times higher in a top 25% firm compared to one of the
smallest 25% firms. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence from Mueller et al.
(2017) who analyze within-firm inequality and find that inequality within firms across
hierarchical occupation layers increases with various measures of firm size.
Lastly, column (5) shows how ownership shares vary with firm size. The model predicts
that ownership shares v∗ should be smaller in larger firms. I approximate ownership
shares by dividing an executive’s wealth by the market capitalization of the firm and
winsorize ownership shares at the top 1% to exclude unreasonably large approximations.
In the top 25% firms, director ownership shares are 4.6% smaller, in top 25-50% firms
ownership shares are 3.9% smaller and in top 50-75% firms ownership shares are 2.9%
smaller compared to the bottom 25%.
3.2.2 Offshoring, Earnings Inequality and the Level of Executive Pay
According to Propositions 2 and 3, offshoring should raise the average compensation
level of managers in the North. To investigate this prediction empirically, I regress
the total compensation (in logs) on a country-industry measure of offshoring and a
set of control variables. The globalization of production is measured by the fraction of
intermediate inputs that are imported from other countries in the country-industry-year





(for high-skilled integration) as these are the fractions of the production labor
wage bill spent on foreign production workers. Both terms are increasing in L. All
specifications include a set of region-specific year fix effects (regions are North America
and Europe). Columns (1) to (3) additionally include firm fix effects to absorb time-
invariant factors at the firm-, country- or industry-level. In columns (4) and (5) I include
director fix effects instead. These absorb all time-invariant individual characteristics
such as talent or experience.
Offshoring might be an endogenous regressor in these empirical specifications. First,
higher wages in industrialized countries simultaneously affect the amount of conducted
offshoring. Second, endogeneity might also arise from unobservable demand or producti-
vity shocks that affect the share of imported intermediates and labor market outcomes
and are not captured by the control variables. These could be for instance technological
factors such as developments in information or communication technologies that affect
offshoring and the productivity of managers alike.9 In order to address these concerns,
9See for example Antràs et al. (2008), Bloom et al. (2014), and Bloom et al. (2012) for empirical
evidence and theoretical models on the relation between I.C.T. and international production.
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I instrument offshoring with the “world export supply” of inputs.10 A valid instrument
should be correlated with trade in intermediates but conditionally uncorrelated with
changes in firm productivity and executive compensation. The variable “world export
supply” is the total value of intermediate goods that is produced in the world (excluding
the country under consideration) and exported to other countries (again excluding the
country under consideration) in the same year. These inputs are weighted according to
input coefficients for each output industry in the country under consideration.11 The
instrument captures developments of comparative advantages of the input supplying
countries, weighted according to the historical relevance of those inputs for the output
industries of a firm where a given manager is employed. These shifts in input specific
comparative advantages should only have an impact on the compensation of executives
through the offshoring channel to be a valid instrument.
- Table 3 here -
Table 3 reports the results. The upper panel A reports the ordinary least squares es-
timates, the lower panel B the instrumental variable results. All standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the country-industry level. Notably, the coefficient magni-
tudes of the IV regressions are larger than the OLS estimates. One explanation for
the larger magnitude of the IV estimates can be that the treatment effects of offsho-
ring are not constant across managers. While the OLS estimator identifies the average
effect of offshoring on executive pay across the managers within the sample, the IV
approach identifies local treatment effects: since executive pay adjusts heterogeneously
to international integration according to the theory, the model predicts a larger treat-
ment effect for more talented agents which are employed by larger firms. Consequently,
changes in the world export supply (the IV) have larger effects on the compensation of
that subgroup.12 Therefore, I consider both estimators to be informative. On the one
hand, the OLS might suffer from endogeneity biases but identifies the average effect of
offshoring. On the other hand, the IV controls for endogeneity but identifies a treat-
ment effect for those managers who are affected by changes in the international supply
of intermediates.
In columns (1) to (3), I regress executive pay on offshoring, firm fix effects and region-
year fix effects. Throughout these columns I subsequently add additional control va-
riables. Column (2) includes industry output, imports and exports (all in logs) and
10This idea is based on Hummels et al. (2014) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) who also instrument
offshoring with the world export supply of inputs.
11I use time-invariant input coefficients for the year 2000, the first year of the sample period.
12When exploring pay inequality later, the difference in magnitudes between OLS and IV becomes
smaller. The OLS-IV magnitude differences in this study are comparable to those in Hummels et al.
(2014).
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column (3) additionally includes assets (in logs), a multinational dummy and leverage
as firm-level controls. Offshoring is positive and significant at the 1-5% level in the
OLS estimates and at the 5-10% level in the IV estimates. Taking the IV coefficients at
face value would imply that the mean rise in offshoring throughout the sample period
between 2000 and 201413 has contributed to an increase in executive pay of about 4.5-
7.2%. Furthermore, executive pay is positively associated with industry output. The
estimated correlations imply a positive output-pay elasticity of 0.19-0.34.
The estimated effects in columns (1) to (3) absorb firm fix effects and therefore do
not net out pay increases from attracting better talented managers or reorganizing the
composition of the management within the firm. Consequently, I replace the firm fix
effects with director fix effects in columns (4) and (5) to estimate how the offshoring
exposure of an individual executive affects his pay. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find
that a large extent of the heterogeneity in firm decisions and organizational practices
can be explained by the presence of individual director fixed effect. Consequently,
including these director fix effects allow to capture how offshoring affects an individual
executive’s pay after controlling for changes in the composition of the executive team.14
The estimated coefficients are substantially smaller compared to the estimations with
firm fix effects, both in terms of size and statistical significance. The IV coefficients
suggest that the mean rise in offshoring throughout the sample period has lead to an
individual pay increase of about 2.9-3.5%.
Next, I want to explore if offshoring affects pay levels heterogeneously between the
executives from different firms. I regress the total or equity-linked compensation (in
logs) on interactions of the four size quartile dummies with the offshoring measure,
controlling for industry output, imports and exports (in logs), region-year fixed effects
and director fixed effects.
- Table 4 here -
Table 4 reports the results. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the total
annual level of compensation. Column (2) additionally includes the firm-level controls
assets, the MNE dummy and leverage. Instrumental variables are constructed by inte-
racting the time-invariant size quartile dummies with the world export supply variable.
Both, the OLS and the IV estimates suggest that globalization affects managers diffe-
rently across firms. Throughout all estimations in (1) and (2), managers of top 25%
13The sample mean increased by 2.8 percentage points (>26%) from 10.53% to 13.32% of imported
intermediates.
14For example Marin et al. (2015) find that headquarters reorganize when firms import a larger
fraction of intermediate inputs.
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firms receive the highest globalization-induced earnings premium. According to the IV
estimates in column (2), a director working for a top 25% firm obtains an earnings
premium of 8.1% due to the mean rise in offshoring throughout the sample period (sig-
nificant at the 1% level). This earnings premium equals 7.6% for directors in a top
25-50% firm (significant at the 1% level) and 4.0% for directors in a top 50-75% firm
(significant at the 5% level). These effects are less pronounced when considering the
equity-linked compensation in column (4). Here, I find significantly negative earnings
responses for directors working for the smallest 25% of firms. Positive equity-linked
earnings premiums in larger firms turn out statistically insignificant from zero. Figure
3 plots these estimated effects of an average sample period increase in offshoring on
total executive pay (in blue) and on equity-linked pay (in red).
- Table 5 here -
Table 5 reports results on the effects of offshoring on earnings inequality between ma-
nagers and workers within firms. The dependent variable “within-firm pay inequality”
is the log difference between director compensation and the labor expenditure per em-
ployee within the firm. In a recent study, Song et al. (2015) document for the U.S. that
a substantial part of the rise in overall earnings dispersion is accounted for by increa-
sing wage dispersion across firms and only to a small extend by increasing within-firm
inequality. Similarly, I find only mild effects of offshoring on the pay gap between
executives and workers within firms. If anything, offshoring has only a negative effect
on within-firm earnings inequality for the smallest 25% of firms. After controlling for
industry imports, exports and output, firm assets, MNE status, and leverage as well
as director and region-year fixed effects in column (2), offshoring has a significantly
negative effect on within-firm inequality for the smallest firms in the sample.
3.2.3 Offshoring and Incentives: Pay and Wealth Sensitivity
Propositions 2 and 3 also suggest that globalization increases the monetary incentives
that executive face, measured as the dollar value change of an executive’s compensa-
tion (or wealth, since the model is static) as a response to the firm’s realized return.
In the model, this effect on incentives is driven by scaling up the value of the firm.
Globalization increases demand and matching the supply of production workers and
thus increases firm size and value for the largest firms such that the directors’ equity
ownership becomes more valuable and the dollar-return elasticity rises. Table 6 first
reports results on the effect of offshoring on firm valuation.
- Table 6 here -
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I regress the (log) stock price or the (log) enterprise value (market capitalization plus
total value of debt) on offshoring, the usual controls and firm fixed effects. Over-
all, stock prices react more elastic on offshoring than enterprise values. Nevertheless,
both measures of firm valuation increase when production becomes more international.
According to the IV estimates in columns (2) and (4), the sample mean increase in
offshoring between 2000 and 2014 is associated with a 13.0% rise in stock prices and
a 10.3% rise in enterprise value. In order to see what this implies for the monetary
incentives that executives face, I regress offshoring on the stock wealth (in logs) and on
the approximated wealth delta (in logs). Results are presented in Table 7.
- Table 7 here -
Overall, I find that offshoring has a positive effect on equity wealth and pay-performance
sensitivity. Taking the estimated coefficients in columns (2) and (4) at face value implies
that the sample mean increase in offshoring between 2000 and 2014 raised the value of
executive wealth by 11.5% and the wealth delta by 9.6%.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I incorporate a stylized principal-agent model into a general equilibrium
theory of talent assignments. Extending the model towards a 2-country version where
agents can match internationally allows to derive predictions on the effect of the global
division of labor on executive pay. I test these predictions with data on executives across
U.S. and European firms. I find that offshoring of production leads to higher executive
pay and higher pay inequality across executives. Furthermore, offshoring contributes
to a stronger pay-performance sensitivity.
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Figure 1: The Effects of a Low-Skill Integration
Figure 2: The Effects of a High-Skill Integration
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th pct. Median 75th pct.
director-year level
Total Pay (in Thd. USD) 110,359 3,115 10,199 266 947 3,026
Equity Pay (in Thd. USD) 79,391 3,374 1,1410 248 1,055 3,258
Wealth Delta (in Thd. USD per %) 103,216 399 7,676 7 38 153
Ownership (Share) 103,185 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02
firm-year level
Total Assets (in Mio. USD) 22,656 21,744 150,443 53 341 2778
MNE (Dummy) 22,661 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
Leverage (Share) 22,648 0.30 0.31 0.01 0.25 0.46
Enterprise Value (in Mio. USD) 22,401 10,236 45,452 42 333 3,104
country/industry-year level
Offshoring (Share) 1,652 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.36
Imports (in Mio. USD) 1,652 11,911 18,915 1,606 4,569 14,439
Exports (in Mio. USD) 1,652 12,071 20,954 1,290 5,054 14,274
Output (in Mio. USD) 1,652 71,317 114,707 13,689 32,448 80,819
World Export Supply (in Mio. USD) 1,652 293,968 196,267 157,127 233,780 381,691
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Table 2: The Cross-Section of Executive Pay
ln Total pay ln Equity pay ln Wealth delta ln Pay gap Ownership share
Highest company value quartile 2.444*** 2.729*** 2.342*** 2.543*** -0.0481***
(0.0525) (0.0676) (0.0930) (0.0798) (0.00399)
2nd highest company value quartile 1.766*** 1.938*** 1.548*** 1.814*** -0.0402***
(0.0467) (0.0618) (0.0649) (0.0638) (0.00469)
3nd highest company value quartile 0.996*** 0.993*** 0.776*** 1.010*** -0.0294***
(0.0434) (0.0721) (0.0643) (0.0568) (0.00471)
CEO dummy 0.670*** 0.821*** 0.602*** 0.628*** 0.0171***
(0.0400) (0.0303) (0.0289) (0.0251) (0.00306)
Executive dummy 0.373*** 0.461*** 1.159*** 0.196*** 0.0329***
(0.0451) (0.0369) (0.0438) (0.0663) (0.00595)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113,194 80,600 101,724 71,394 107,385
R-squared 0.677 0.617 0.548 0.691 0.076
Number of firms 0 0 0 0 0
Country-industry clusters 364 364 364 364 364
Notes: Company value quartile dummies measure the average 2000-2014 size quartile of the
firm based on the sum of market capitalization and debt. For more details on the dependent
variables see the Data Appendix. All estimations include a set of 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4,
year and region (U.S. and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the
country-industry level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3: Offshoring and Executive Pay Levels
ln Total pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
Offshoring 0.609** 0.838*** 0.684*** 0.295 0.198
(0.269) (0.264) (0.233) (0.235) (0.234)
ln Industry output 0.266*** 0.188*** 0.112*** 0.0843**
(0.0813) (0.0699) (0.0367) (0.0342)
ln Industry exports 0.0203 0.0147 0.00818 0.00504
(0.0268) (0.0254) (0.0200) (0.0198)
ln Industry imports -0.0409 -0.0569 -0.0141 -0.00870
(0.0508) (0.0388) (0.0250) (0.0260)







Offshoring 2.059* 2.490** 1.581** 1.240* 1.040
(1.083) (1.015) (0.759) (0.674) (0.716)
ln Industry output 0.335*** 0.226*** 0.173*** 0.138***
(0.0816) (0.0721) (0.0521) (0.0526)
ln Industry exports 0.0345 0.0224 0.0125 0.00884
(0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0216) (0.0213)
ln Industry imports -0.115** -0.0971** -0.0467 -0.0377
(0.0572) (0.0483) (0.0330) (0.0342)






First stage: World Export Supply 0.000000154*** 0.000000135*** 0.000000135*** 0.000000208*** 0.000000208***
(2.77e-08) (2.26e-08) (2.26e-08) (2.36e-08) (2.36e-08)
First stage F-statistic 30.93 35.92 35.75 77.94 77.7
Number of firms 3,813 3,812 3,812 3,666 3,665
Number of directors 26,354 26,344 26,336 20,467 20,453
Country-industry clusters 318 318 318 312 312
Observations 110,359 110,247 110,179 104,379 104,305
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Director fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: For more details on the variables see the Data Appendix. Reported F-statistics are
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistics. All estimations include a set of firm or director and region-
year (U.S. and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the country-industry
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Offshoring and Executive Earnings Inequality
ln Total pay ln Total pay ln Equity pay
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: OLS
Offshoring x Size Q1 1.271*** 0.564* 0.420
(0.341) (0.310) (0.490)
Offshoring x Size Q2 0.769** 0.611** 0.721
(0.337) (0.309) (0.443)
Offshoring x Size Q3 0.0575 0.183 -0.626
(0.293) (0.291) (0.552)
Offshoring x Size Q4 -1.383*** -0.646** -1.681***
(0.281) (0.275) (0.529)
Panel B: IV
Offshoring x Size Q1 3.944*** 2.803*** 2.117
(0.904) (0.898) (1.699)
Offshoring x Size Q2 3.160*** 2.622*** 2.557
(0.866) (0.860) (1.791)
Offshoring x Size Q3 1.625** 1.402** -0.366
(0.677) (0.671) (1.628)
Offshoring x Size Q4 -1.376** -0.750 -3.992***
(0.634) (0.553) (1.431)
First stages: World Export Supply x Qx
W.E.S. x Qx > 0 and significant at < 1%? Yes Yes Yes
First stage F-statistics 14.55 14.48 10.28
Number of firms 3,633 3,632 2,862
Number of directors 20,307 20,296 15,216
Country-industry clusters 311 311 242
Observations 103,682 103,621 72,170
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Director fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Q1 (Q4) corresponds to the largest (smallest) size quartile. Firm controls are assets
(in logs), a MNE dummy and leverage. Industry controls are exports, imports and output
(all in logs). For more details on the variables see the Data Appendix. Reported F-statistics
are Kleibergen-Paap rank statistics based on all four first stages. All estimations include a
set of firm or director and region-year (U.S. and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are
cluster-robust at the country-industry level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous Effects across Firms
Notes: The figure plots the estimated percentage change of the sample average increase in
offshoring during 2000 - 2014 on executive pay. Total (equity) pay changes are drawn in blue
(red). The dashed lines correspond on the 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on
the IV regressions from columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.
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Offshoring x Size Q1 1.164*** 0.318
(0.430) (0.408)
Offshoring x Size Q2 0.280 -0.00529
(0.348) (0.325)
Offshoring x Size Q3 -0.359 -0.287
(0.402) (0.426)
Offshoring x Size Q4 -2.001*** -1.293***
(0.396) (0.404)
Panel B: IV
Offshoring x Size Q1 2.662*** 1.387
(0.944) (1.052)
Offshoring x Size Q2 1.323 0.674
(0.921) (1.058)
Offshoring x Size Q3 -0.106 -0.438
(1.202) (1.431)
Offshoring x Size Q4 -3.119*** -2.563**
(0.881) (1.109)
First stages: World Export Supply x Qx
W.E.S. x Qx > 0 and significant at < 1%? Yes Yes
First stage F-statistics 36.59 36.73
Number of firms 2,786 2,786
Number of directors 12,965 12,962
Country-industry clusters 287 287
Observations 64,324 64,309
Industry controls Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes
Director fixed effects Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: Q1 (Q4) corresponds to the largest (smallest) size quartile. Firm controls are assets
(in logs), a MNE dummy and leverage. Industry controls are exports, imports and output (all
in logs). For more details on the variables see the Data Appendix. Reported F-statistics are
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistics based on all four first stages. All estimations include a set of
director and region-year (U.S. and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster-robust
at the country-industry level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Offshoring and Firm Valuation
ln Stock Price ln Enterprise Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Offshoring 1.807*** 1.612*** 0.715 0.500
(0.512) (0.532) (0.612) (0.380)
ln Industry output 0.0984 0.329***
(0.154) (0.102)
ln Industry exports 0.0401 -0.0267
(0.0444) (0.0334)
ln Industry imports 0.160 0.233**
(0.106) (0.108)
Panel B: IV
Offshoring 4.080** 4.366* 3.505** 3.504**
(1.895) (2.479) (1.591) (1.547)
ln Industry output 0.258 0.505***
(0.163) (0.113)
ln Industry exports 0.0699 0.00570
(0.0490) (0.0350)
ln Industry imports 0.00832 0.0684
(0.161) (0.0932)
First stage: World Export Supply 0.000000238*** 0.0000002*** 0.000000239*** 0.000000201***
(1.96e-08) (2.25e-08) (1.96e-08) (2.26e-08)
First stage F-statistic 148.19 78.74 149.38 79.08
Number of firms 3,374 3,372 3,349 3,347
Country-industry clusters 305 305 303 303
Observations 22,170 22,131 21,781 21,743
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: For more details on the variables see the Data Appendix. Reported F-statistics are
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistics. All estimations include a set of firm and region-year (U.S.
and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the country-industry level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Offshoring and Pay Sensitivity
ln Wealth in Shares ln Wealth Delta
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Offshoring 1.272** 0.504 0.975* 0.690*
(0.623) (0.480) (0.504) (0.393)
ln Industry output 0.392** 0.0237 0.285** 0.0989*
(0.165) (0.0746) (0.144) (0.0573)
ln Industry exports -0.0291 0.00760 -0.00808 0.0238
(0.0606) (0.0507) (0.0573) (0.0364)
ln Industry imports -0.0995 0.0102 -0.0805 -0.0118
(0.117) (0.0605) (0.105) (0.0531)
ln Assets 0.414*** 0.350*** 0.347*** 0.305***
(0.0347) (0.0244) (0.0221) (0.0226)
MNE -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.0492 -0.0530*
(0.0390) (0.0400) (0.0301) (0.0306)
Leverage -0.545*** -0.483*** -0.555*** -0.499***
(0.101) (0.0764) (0.0670) (0.0588)
Panel B: IV
Offshoring 6.916** 3.901** 5.323** 3.286*
(3.377) (1.973) (2.689) (1.723)
ln Industry output 0.635*** 0.236 0.460** 0.263**
(0.207) (0.151) (0.179) (0.119)
ln Industry exports 0.0146 0.0241 0.0273 0.0380
(0.0757) (0.0568) (0.0696) (0.0388)
ln Industry imports -0.354*** -0.108 -0.270** -0.100*
(0.134) (0.0786) (0.110) (0.0598)
ln Assets 0.408*** 0.347*** 0.342*** 0.302***
(0.0359) (0.0243) (0.0229) (0.0229)
MNE -0.115*** -0.123*** -0.0490 -0.0567*
(0.0393) (0.0405) (0.0304) (0.0306)
Leverage -0.534*** -0.475*** -0.545*** -0.493***
(0.102) (0.0759) (0.0679) (0.0581)
First stage: World Export Supply 0.00000013*** 0.000000198*** 0.00000013*** 0.000000203***
(2.31e-08) (2.53e-08) (2.27e-08) (2.49e-08)
First stage F-statistic 31.76 61.57 32.43 66.26
Number of firms 3,662 3,538 3,705 3,583
Number of directors 22,886 17,715 24,345 18,865
Country-industry clusters 289 284 305 299
Observations 95,505 90,344 101,672 96,198
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Director fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: For more details on the variables see the Data Appendix. Reported F-statistics are
Kleibergen-Paap rank statistics. All estimations include a set of firm or director and region-
year (U.S. and Europe) fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the country-industry
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
34
References
Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez.
The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 27(3):3–20, 2013.
Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. Offshoring in a Knowledge
Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):31–77, 2006.
Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. Organizing Offshoring:
Middle Managers and Communication Costs. In Helpman, Elhanan, Dalia Marin, and
Thierry Verdier, editors, The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy, chapter 10,
pages 311–340. Harvard University Press, 2008.
Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. Top Incomes in the
Long Run of History. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(1):3–71, 2011.
Autor, David H., David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Jae Song. Trade Adjust-
ment: Worker Level Evidence. NBER Working Papers 19226, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, 2013.
Bakija, Jon, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim. Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners
and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data.
Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-22, Department of Economics, Williams
College, 2008.
Baldwin, Richard. The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globali-
zation. Harvard University Press, 2016.
Baldwin, Richard and Javier Lopez-Gonzalez. Supply-Chain Trade: A Portrait of
Global Patterns and Several Testable Hypotheses. The World Economy, 38(11):1682–1721,
2015.
Baranchuk, Nina, Glenn MacDonald, and Jun Yang. The Economics of Super Mana-
gers. Review of Financial Studies, 24(10):3321–3368, 2011.
Baumgarten, Daniel, Ingo Geishecker, and Holger Görg. Offshoring, Tasks, and the
Skill-Wage Pattern. European Economic Review, 61(C):132–152, 2013.
Becker, Sascha O., Karolina Ekholm, and Marc-Andreas Muendler. Offshoring and
the Onshore Composition of Tasks and Skills. Journal of International Economics, 90(1):91–
106, 2013.
Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck? The
Ones Without Principals are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3):901–932, 2001.
35
Bertrand, Marianne and Antoinette Schoar. Managing with Style: The Effect of Ma-
nagers on Firm Policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4):1169–1208, 2003.
Bloom, Nicholas, Luis Garicano, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. The
Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Orga-
nization. Management Science, 60(12):2859–2885, 2014.
Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. Americans Do IT Better:
US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle. American Economic Review, 102(1):167–
201, 2012.
Chaney, Thomas. Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International
Trade. American Economic Review, 98(4):1707–21, 2008.
Cuñat, Vicente and Maria Guadalupe. How Does Product Market Competition Shape
Incentive Contracts? Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(5):1058–1082, 2005.
Cuñat, Vicente and Maria Guadalupe. Globalization and the Provision of Incentives
inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition. Journal of Labor Economics, 27(2):179–
212, 2009.
Edmans, Alex, Xavier Gabaix, and Augustin Landier. A Multiplicative Model of
Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium. Review of Financial Studies, 22(12):4881–
4917, 2009.
Falato, Antonio and Dalida Kadyrzhanova. Optimal CEO Incentives and Industry
Dynamics. Finance and Economics Series 2012-78, Federal Reserve System, 2012.
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson. The Impact of Outsourcing and High-
Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 114(3):907–940, 1999.
Frydman, Carola and Dimitris Papanikolaou. In Search of Ideas: Technological Inno-
vation and Executive Pay Inequality. Technical Report, 2016.
Gabaix, Xavier and Augustin Landier. Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 123(1):49–100, 2008.
Garicano, Luis. Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production. Journal of
Political Economy, 108(5):874–904, 2000.
Grossman, Gene M. and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory
of Offshoring. American Economic Review, 98(5):1978–97, 2008.
Gumpert, Anna. The Organization of Knowledge in Multinational Firms. Technical Report,
University of Munich, 2014.
36
Hummels, David, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi. The Nature and Growth of Vertical
Specialization in World Trade. Journal of International Economics, 54(1):75–96, 2001.
Hummels, David, Rasmus Jørgensen, Jakob Munch, and Chong Xiang. The Wage
Effects of Offshoring: Evidence from Danish Matched Worker-Firm Data. American Eco-
nomic Review, 104(6):1597–1629, 2014.
Johnson, Robert C. and Guillermo Noguera. Accounting for Intermediates: Production
Sharing and Trade in Value Added. Journal of International Economics, 86(2):224–236,
2012.
Lustig, Hanno, Chad Syverson, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Technological Change
and the Growing Inequality in Managerial Compensation. Journal of Financial Economics,
99(3):601–627, 2011.
Marin, Dalia, Jan Schymik, and Alexander Tarasov. Trade in Tasks and the Organi-
zation of Firms. CEPR Discussion Papers 10626, C.E.P.R., 2015.
Melitz, Marc J. The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Indu-
stry Productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725, 2003.
Monte, Ferdinando. Skill Bias, Trade, and Wage Dispersion. Journal of International
Economics, 83(2):202–218, 2011.
Mueller, Holger M, Paige Ouimet, and Elena Simintzi. Within-Firm Pay Inequality.
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming, 2017.
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez. Top Incomes and the Great Recession: Recent
Evolutions and Policy Implications. IMF Economic Review, 61(3):456–478, 2013.
Song, Jae, David J. Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom, and Till von Wach-
ter. Firming Up Inequality. NBER Working Papers 21199, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, 2015.
Terviö, Marko. The Difference That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach. Ame-
rican Economic Review, 98(3):642–668, 2008.
Timmer, Marcel P., Abdul Azeez Erumban, Bart Los, Robert Stehrer, and Gaait-
zen J. de Vries. Slicing Up Global Value Chains. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
28(2):99–118, 2014.
Wu, Yanhui. Managerial Incentives and Compensation in a Global Market. CEP Discussion
Papers 1066, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, 2011.
37
Mathematical Appendix
Closed Economy Equilibrium (Proposition 1)
The following proof illustrates the equilibrium characterization in the closed economy
case.
Incentive Pay The optimal contract gives the agent his expected wage E [w | e = 0] =
r.
E [w | e = 0] = f + vπ = r
E [w | e = e] = f + v (1 + e) π = f + vπ + evπ = r + evπ.


















Hence, the agent receives the lowest possible incentive compatible amount of equity
that will pay him the fraction Λ of his compensation in equity. The salary f ∗ is chosen
to ensure that expected pay is r:
f ∗ = r − v∗π = r (1− Λ) .
Assignment and Expected Pay To determine the expected compensation r (s), I
make use of a standard assignment equation that equates the expected marginal cost
of a manager with skill s with the expected marginal benefit of this manager:
∂E [(1 + η) (1 + e) π (z, s)]
∂s |z=z(s)
= r′ (s)
as in Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Monte (2011).
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The l.h.s. of this equation can be stated as follows:
























Next, I take the integral from sc to s and fix r (sc) = 1 to obtain r (s):
∫ s
sc






























Cutoff Skill and Nominal GDP Setting the labor market clearing and the zero
earnings cutoff condition equal gives the marginal skill level sc:















into the term for X to obtain the term



















Since both curves intersect once, there exists a unique equilibrium solution for X and
sc










Next, the expected compensation for managers can be stated as follows:







X (1− sσc )































































Open Economy Equilibrium with Low-Skill Integration (Propo-
sition 2)
The zero cutoff earnings curve remains unaffected: since the price index remains identi-
cal to the closed economy case for any value of sc (there are still only Northern managers
and technologies affecting the price index). However, there is a larger supply of pro-
duction agents from the South that can be employed by Northern firms such that the




(sc + L) .
The new marginal skill level sc satisfies











such that sc falls with increasing L. Furthermore, the nominal GDP increases which
can be directly concluded from sc ↓ and the zero earnings cutoff condition (8). The
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expected compensation r (s) is still determined by the assignment equation that equates
the expected marginal cost of a manager with skill s with the expected marginal benefit
of this manager and remains unaffected













Consequently, the lower marginal skill level sc implies that there will be more Northern
agents in management occupations and that the expected skill premium for management
occupations increases for all Northern managers. Furthermore, the equity share v∗ is
falling due to a larger effective market size M (sc ↓ ⇒ M ↑ ⇒ v
∗ ↓ ) and the value of
equity is increasing for each manager in the North.
Open Economy Equilibrium with High-Skill Integration (Propo-
sition 3)





















































































(ασ − sσc )
]1/(1−σ)
.


















(ασ − sσc )
]
s1−σc











Note that X could become negative for sc → 1 as (1 + Lα
σ−1) < (1 + Lα−1). However













− (α + L) = α1−σ − α > 0
such that X > 0 for all sc < α.
There is also a larger supply of production agents from the South (since not all Southern
agents become managers) that can be employed by Northern firms. Production labor
supply equals L+α
α







































> 0, the marginal skill level falls with more integration
(larger L). As the zero earnings cutoff is satisfied in equilibrium, M must be larger.
This increase in M implies that the GDP level is higher (because P is lower).
To determine equilibrium expected compensation r (s) a case distinction is necessary.
The marginal benefit of a manager is given by











Integrating the marginal benefit over the skill distribution from sc to s and fixing
r (sc) = 1 gives
• for skills sc < s < α
∫ s
sc
µ (σ − 1)Mtσ−2
α + L
α





























• for skills sc < α < s











































































+ 1 if sc < α < s.
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Data Appendix
List of Covered Stock Market Indices
continental Europe: AEX, AEX MidCap, BCN GLOBAL 100, BEL 20, BEL 20 INSTI-
TUTIONAL, CAC 40, DAX, EUROTOP 100, FTSE/MIB, IGBM, ISEQ OVERALL,
LUXX, MDAX, MIBTEL, MIDEX, OBX, OMX, OMX 20, PSI 20, SBF 120, SMF,
TecDAX, WIG 20
United Kingdom: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE AIM, FTSE FLEDGLING, FTSE
SMALL CAP, FTSE TECHMARK ALL SHARE, JSE ALL SHARE
North America: DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVG, NASDAQ 100, S&P 500, S&P
MidCap 400, S&P/TSX COMPOSITE, S&P/TSX 60
Variable Descriptions
ln Total pay: total annual compensation of an executive (in logs); comprises direct
(cash) and indirect (equity) based compensation
ln Equity pay: total equity-based annual compensation of an executive (in logs); com-
prises all sorts of equity (option grants, stocks, LTIPS)
ln Wealth delta: change in the individual’s wealth in the company for each 1% change
in the stock price (in logs)
ln Wealth in shares: value of shares held by the individual (in logs); these are valued
at the closing stock price of the annual report date
ln Pay gap: total annual compensation of an executive divided by (ff_labor_exp ×
exch_rate_usd) / ff_emp_num (in logs)
Within-firm pay inequality: total annual compensation of an executive (in logs) minus
(ff_labor_exp × exch_rate_usd) / ff_emp_num (also in logs)
Ownership share: total executive wealth divided by total market capitalization; wins-
orized at 1%
CEO dummy: dummy=1 if manager is the CEO of the firm in the current year
Executive dummy: dummy=1 if manager is member of the executive board in the
current year
Company value quartile dummies (Size Qx): dummies for each firm size quartile Q1
(largest) - Q4 (smallest); quartiles are based on average firm site during 2000 - 2014,
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where size is the mean of the total enterprise value, i.e. market capitalization plus value
of debt (ff_entrpr_val)
ln Assets: total firm assets (in logs)
MNE: dummy=1 if firm reports any foreign assets (ff_assets_intl)
Leverage: value of debt (ff_debt) divided by the sum of debt and equity (ff_debt +
ff_eq_tot); winsorized at 1%
ln Stock price: end-of-year stock price (ff_price_secs) (in logs)
ln Enterprise value: market capitalization plus value of debt (ff_entrpr_val) (in logs)
Offshoring: share of imported intermediates relative to the total intermediate consump-
tion at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 output industry level from WIOD Release 2016, matched
to the main 4-digit SIC output industry of the firm
ln Industry output: gdp (in logs) at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 output industry level from
WIOD Release 2016, matched to the main 4-digit SIC output industry of the firm
ln Industry exports: exports (in logs) at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 output industry level
from WIOD Release 2016, matched to the main 4-digit SIC output industry of the firm
ln Industry imports: imports (in logs) at the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 output industry level
from WIOD Release 2016, matched to the main 4-digit SIC output industry of the firm
World export supply: total sum of exported intermediates from and to third party
countries (in million USD) weighted according to fixed country-level input coefficients
from 2000, data are measured at the country-industry level for each year at the ISIC
Rev. 4 output industry level from WIOD Release 2016
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Figure 4: Aggregate Trends in the Sample
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